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ABSTRACT
In wireless roaming a mobile device obtains a service from
some foreign network while being registered for the similar
service at its own home network. However, recent proposals
try to keep the service provider role behind the home net-
work and let the foreign network create a tunnel connection
through which all service requests of the mobile device are
sent to and answered directly by the home network. Such
Wireless Roaming via Tunnels (WRT) offers several (secu-
rity) benefits but states also new security challenges on au-
thentication and key establishment, as the goal is not only to
protect the end-to-end communication between the tunnel
peers but also the tunnel itself.
In this paper we formally specify mutual authentication
and key establishment goals for WRT and propose an effi-
cient and provably secure protocol that can be used to secure
such roaming session. Additionally, we describe some mod-
ular protocol extensions to address resistance against DoS
attacks, anonymity of the mobile device and unlinkability of
its roaming sessions, as well as the accounting claims of the
foreign network in commercial scenarios.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
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Security and Protection, Data Communications; C 2.1 [Net-
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cations; C 2.2 [Network Protocols]
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the today’s world of mobility one may observe the in-
creasing popularity of wireless networks and devices, both in
companies and private households. In many environments
wireless technology is the default access technology for a
variety of services. Its ubiquity combined to the demands
on mobility leads to the interesting research area of wireless
roaming.
The main goal of wireless roaming is to provide a mobile
device that is registered at its own home network where it
can access certain services, e.g. diverse Internet and mobile
(phone) applications, with similar services when it roams to
another foreign network. The problem is that the foreign
network is usually not aware whether the mobile device is
authorized to request a roaming connection, and the mobile
device may not know whether the foreign network is autho-
rized to provide this connection (as a contract partner of the
home network).
Current solutions for wireless roaming deployed in wireless
local networks (WLANs) and also in mobile phone networks
(GSM, CDMA, UMTS, CDMA2000) assume that the re-
quested service is provided directly by the foreign network.
The actual involvement of the home network is reduced to
the necessary actions related to the authentication of the
mobile device and the foreign network as well as the estab-
lishment of a security association (e.g., session keys) between
these two entities.
The recent proposal for wireless roaming by Sastry et
al. [48] is conceptually different. Instead of considering the
foreign network as the actual service provider they suggest
to keep this role behind the home network by establishing an
opaque tunnel connection between the networks and using
it to provide the mobile device with the requested service.
The main technical contribution of our work is the de-
sign of a formal security model for authentication and key
establishment in Wireless Roaming via Tunnels (WRT, for
short) and its realization through a suitable protocol. Sec-
tion 2 introduces the WRT concept as a solution for various
practical problems. Section 3 describes related work on au-
thentication and key establishment in wireless roaming. In
the scope of the security model in Section 4 we describe basic
trust assumptions on the protocol participants and specify
necessary mutual authentication and key exchange require-
ments. For the proposed protocol, called AWRT, those basic
version is described in Section 5 we give detailed security
analysis with respect to the specified security goals, provide
some efficiency remarks and brief ideas on the practical real-
ization of the tunneled connection. In Section 6 we address
several (modular) protocol extensions dealing with forward
secrecy for the established keys, stricter resistance against
various types of DoS attacks, anonymity and unlinkability
issues for the roaming mobile device, and the use of the pro-
tocol in commercial scenarios, in which the foreign network
is supposed to be reimbursed for the maintenance of the
tunnel. We conclude in Section 7.
2. WIRELESS ROAMING VIA TUNNELS
In the following, we introduce the general concept of WRT
and illustrate the main differences between our architecture
and the original proposal [48]. We then present the advan-
tages and disadvantages of using tunnels as an alternative
way to obtain services. Finally, we identify the desired se-
curity goals for this new approach.
2.1 The Concept
The main scenario we deal with is that a mobile device,
that belongs to a home network (e.g., its company) tempo-
rary moves to a foreign network which cannot authenticate
it directly. The mobile user would like to access the Inter-
net as a general service from this network under the same
conditions and (security and network) policies as within its
home network. For this, an opaque tunnel is created from
the foreign network to the home network and all the packets
sent by the mobile device are sent via this tunnel to its home
network that forwards them to the Internet if appropriate.
The only currently available solution for the tunnel-based
roaming by Sastry et al. [48] is based on VPN tunnels se-
curing the end-to-end communication between the mobile
device and its home network. In their scheme the foreign
network accepts every device without any authentication
and grants it access to the home network over the Inter-
net. The mobile device can thus initiate a VPN connection
(using NAT traversal techniques if necessary). However, this
solution has several weaknesses. First, the Internet access
granted by the foreign network, even a restricted one, may
bear intrusion risks to its infrastructure. Second, the mobile
device must comply with the network layer infrastructure
of the foreign network (e.g., IPv4/IPv6, IP assignment via
DHCP). Third, VPN tunnels do not provide any proof to
the foreign network that the mobile device is connecting to
its real home network as a VPN connection can be estab-
lished to any server on the Internet. Fourth, foreign and
home networks do not authenticate each other and, as a
consequence, neither accounting mechanisms nor quality-of-
service contracts can be securely implemented. We fairly
remark that Sastry et al. were focusing on the actual archi-
tecture for the city-wide WiFi roaming rather than dealing
with the related authentication and key establishment goals.
Our approach is different. We increase the involvement of
the foreign network into the roaming process by considering
it as an inherent part of the security architecture with the
obvious goal to eliminate the above mentioned weaknesses.
In our setting the foreign network does not simply agree to
grant the mobile device a restricted Internet access to the
claimed home network but is responsible for the establish-
ment of the tunnel connection between the both after hav-
ing verified their authenticity. To achieve the desired goals
we propose a three-party authentication and key establish-
ment protocol between the mobile device, the foreign and
the home network. This protocol permits the authentication
of participants and exchange of relevant session keys — not
only for the end-to-end secure communication between the
device and its home network but also for the secure commu-
nication with the foreign network. The successful execution
of our protocol means that the foreign network will tunnel
all the data sent by the mobile device from its access point
to its home network, lowering the risk of intrusion into its
own infrastructure.
2.2 Pro and Contra
The concept of WRT appears attractive mostly because of
the additional security benefits which it offers and because
it shifts the role of the service provider back to the home
network, this in contrast to the non-tunnel-based approach.
WRT offers several benefits for the foreign network. First,
the automatic forwarding of messages provides better pro-
tection of the foreign network’s infrastructure, reducing the
risk of unauthorized access and intrusion attempts by ma-
licious devices. Second, in WRT the mobile device appears
to the outside world (e.g., when accessing a server on the
Internet) as part of its home network. Therefore, if a mo-
bile device misbehaves (e.g., up-/downloads illegal content
or mounts DoS attacks) causing investigation and IP trace-
back, the foreign network cannot be blamed or blacklisted
for it; Robert et al. [45] argue that WRT would lower the
risk for the involvement of the foreign network into the legal
investigations resulting from such malicious activities. Ad-
ditionally, using WRT effectively prevents the mobile device
from using any value-added services to which the access is
granted based on the IP membership within the domain of
the foreign network (e.g., access to digital libraries).
WRT still requires mutual authentication between the mo-
bile device and its home network. This eliminates imperson-
ation attacks in case that the foreign network misbehaves.
In contrast to the non-tunnel-based approach, WRT may ef-
fectively prevent DNS manipulations by the foreign network;
thus, thwarting pharming attacks [51]. In WRT the home
network may effectively enforce own security policies regard-
ing the provided service. In particular, the mobile device
may access the same set of services while it roams, whereas
in the non-tunnel-based approach it can access services of-
fered by the foreign network. For example, considering the
connection to the Internet, some networks may impose fire-
wall restrictions on the use of diverse Internet application
protocols. A mobile user which roams to a network with
stricter policies can then still execute applications he is used
to within his own home network.
In commercial roaming scenarios where the foreign net-
work has to be reimbursed for the provided roaming service,
WRT can significantly simplify and strengthen the account-
ing process since both networks can keep track on the du-
ration of the roaming connection and the amount of data
being transferred independently of each other.
One may think, that the use of WRT would result in the
significant increase of the communication latencies, as ev-
ery service request has to be sent and answered through
the communication link between the foreign and the home
network. Obviously, this delay which relates to the round-
trip time could vary depending on the networks and their
geographic location. For example, it has been shown that
in country-wide context (on the example of USA) the ex-
pected round trip latencies for the TCP/IP traffic remains
below 150 ms [34], while in the intercontinental context they
remain below 250 ms for over 90% of the residential broad-
band hosts [23]. These examples show that for many ap-
plications such as web surfing and email the additional la-
tencies in WRT would remain almost unnoticeable, and the
quality of provided service may still be sufficient even for
some real-time applications such as Voice-over-IP for which
– according to the ITU-T recommendations [31] – a one-way
trip latency below 400 ms might still be acceptable.
2.3 Desired Security Goals
Suitable WRT authentication and key establishment pro-
tocols should take care of protecting not only the end-to-end
communication between the mobile device and the home net-
work but also their communication with the foreign network.
Obviously, the mobile device and its home network must
authenticate each other prior to the use of the tunnel and
establish a session end-to-end key, that is considering the
foreign network as a potential man-in-the-middle attacker.
To the contrary, in the non-tunnel-based approach the au-
thentication of the home network towards the mobile device
is usually not required and the session key for the roaming
communication is established between the mobile device and
the foreign network.
Further, it is desirable for both networks to mutually au-
thenticate each other prior to the establishment of the tun-
nel. This would lower the risk of attacks against the infras-
tructure of both networks, including DoS attacks. In com-
mercial scenarios where the foreign network should be reim-
bursed for the established tunnel this mutual authentication
would be useful to implement the accounting process, pos-
sibly in real-time. Further, since the mobile device and the
foreign network may not be aware of each other prior to the
protocol execution, the mutual authentication between the
networks would indirectly prevent roaming sessions where
either the mobile device (hosted by the home network) or
the foreign network is not authorized to request or establish
the tunnel connection, respectively.
In WRT the actual service requests are sent and answered
through the established tunnel and can, therefore, be pro-
tected using end-to-end keys. However, the home network
and the mobile device may also wish to exchange certain
control messages directly with the foreign network; in par-
ticular, checks that the mobile device and the home network
are still connected, requests to close the established connec-
tion, and accounting messages in commercial scenarios. In
order to protect such messages and also achieve better ro-
bustness of the roaming session (in particular, against ses-
sion hijacking and data injection attacks) it is desirable to
provide the foreign network and the tunnel end-peers with
an additional session tunnel key; this key is specific to WRT
and is not required for the non-tunnel-based roaming.
In addition to the previously mentioned mutual authen-
tication and key establishment goals those formal specifica-
tion and realization represents the main focus of this work,
there are additional goals which we informally address to the
end of the paper. Some of them aim to achieve higher ro-
bustness of WRT, e.g., protection against DoS attacks. The
goal here is to minimize the risk that one party keeps an
open connection to another party during the protocol exe-
cution without being able to verify whether that party is a
valid protocol participant. Another desired goal for WRT
in commercial scenarios is to provide the foreign network
with some verifiable information to compose its accounting
claims. Further security goals address the profiling of the
mobile users. In particular, it might be desirable to hide the
user’s identity from the guest network and achieve unlink-
ability of its roaming sessions as it is currently the case in
GSM/UMTS through the use of TMSI.
3. RELATED WORK
Many authentication and key establishment protocols for
wireless roaming have been proposed so far, in both academia
and industry (as part of standardization), ranging from mo-
bile phone networks of the 2nd generation (GSM, CDMA)
and 3rd generation (UMTS, CDMA2000) over to WLANs
(IEEE 802.11 [1]).
Wireless Roaming in Mobile Phone Networks. Most
of the standard authentication and key establishment pro-
tocols for mobile phone networks, e.g., [2, 26, 46], are based
on the pre-shared key between the home network and its
mobile device. These protocols establish the session key be-
tween the mobile device and the foreign network. Several so-
lutions have been further proposed to allow roaming among
different mobile phone networks. For example, the authenti-
cated roaming between GSM and UMTS has been specified
within the UMTS standard [2] and the roaming procedure
between UMTS and CDMA2000 has been addressed in [33].
Wireless Roaming in IP Networks. In wireless IP net-
works, the access control is usually implemented based on
the IEEE 802.11i security architecture, either using pre-
shared keys (WPA, WPA2) or using the IEEE 802.1X speci-
fication. Although pre-shared keys are widely used for home
and small-office networks, these does not actually fit for
roaming. In larger networks, preference is given to IEEE
802.1X that is based on EAP [4], a protocol framework
for the transmission of the authentication information be-
tween clients and networks. The actual protocols imple-
mented within this framework are referred to as EAP meth-
ods and can be based for example on usernames and pass-
words, shared keys, or public-key certificates (supplied by
the client, the server, or both). EAP using TTLS [28] is
used for roaming purpose within the Eduroam infrastruc-
ture composed of the European education institutions that
have reached an agreement [25]. Eduroam uses EAP-TTLS
in association with RADIUS servers hosted in each partner
to authenticate and grant an Internet access to students and
personnel visiting another institution. Another widely used
form of authentication in WLANs, recommended by Wi-Fi
alliance as a best practice solution [5], is web-based such
that the mobile user provides own credentials as input to
the browser form. These credentials are usually forwarded to
the authentication server (e.g., RADIUS). As noticed in [38]
such web-based solutions become vulnerable to the access
point impersonation, address spoofing, and dictionary at-
tacks.
Salgarelli et al. [47] suggested a general roaming authen-
tication framework based on the shared keys which can be
implemented as an EAP method. Their protocol extends the
classical Needham-Schroeder technique to accommodate the
authentication servers of the foreign and the home network
while minimizing the communication rounds between them.
Previously, Molva et al. [40] described another roaming pro-
tocol based on shared keys, which was designed for the in-
tegration into the IBM’s KryptoKnight authentication and
key distribution framework. Merino et al. [37] proposed a
Single Sign-On authentication architecture based on 802.1X
and EAP-TLS [50] relying on the Public Key Infrastructure
(PKI). Their method can be combined with any web-based
authentication method, e.g., UAM. The drawback of this
approach is that the mobile device is assumed to be able to
check the validity of the foreign network’s certificate while
being off-line. Furthermore, the use of public-key operations
might be costly for performance-constraint mobile devices.
Similar drawbacks appear in the authentication protocols
from [6, 29]. Long et al. [36] suggested a roaming protocol
based on the modified SSL handshake assuming that mo-
bile device are equipped with public-key certificates, so that
the protocol can be executed without active involvement of
the home network. Ribeiro et al. [43] described a roaming
authentication approach based on IPsec VPNs and a hier-
archy of certification authorities. The aforementioned prob-
lems with validation of public-key certificates by the mobile
device were solved by Meyer et al. [39] via secret sharing
technique [49]. In their protocol described as an extension
of EAP-TLS each foreign network is assumed to hold a share
of the home network’s secret key and the respective public-
key certificate of the home network is pre-installed at the
mobile device. During the execution of the protocol (which
is a modified TLS handshake) the foreign and the home net-
work need to cooperate in order to perform the required
signature and decryption operations.
The aforementioned solutions proposed for wireless non-
tunnel-based roaming (in mobile phone and wireless IP net-
works) have been designed with the main goal to authenti-
cate (and provide a session key to) the mobile and the foreign
network, whereby some approaches require the interaction
with the home network. The only currently available solu-
tion for the tunnel-based roaming by Sastry et al. [48] has
already been discussed in Section 2.1.
4. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY ESTAB-
LISHMENT MODEL FOR WRT
Here we model authentication and key establishment goals
of a WRT protocol (denoted as Π within the model). Our
definitions extends the classical two-party model from [10].
4.1 Communication Model
4.1.1 Protocol Participants and Long-Lived Keys
We consider a home network H, a mobile device M reg-
istered with H, and a foreign network F as participants of
Π. In practice H and F can be seen as corresponding au-
thentication servers. We do not distinguish between the
participants and their identities, which are assumed to be
unique; the identity of a mobile device M is assumed to
be unique within its own home network H. All protocol
participants are modeled as probabilistic polynomial time
(PPT) machines. We assume that participating H, F , and
M are in possession of their corresponding long-lived keys
LLP , P ∈ {M,F ,H}, which are used in different executions
of Π. We assume that all long-lived keys as well as further
secrets used in Π are polynomially bounded with respect to
some security parameter κ.
4.1.2 Instances and Protocol Sessions
In order to model participation ofM, F , andH in distinct
sessions of Π we consider an unlimited number of instances:
By [P, s] we denote the s-th instance of P ∈ {M,F ,H}
where s ∈ N.
An instance [P, s] may be invoked for one session. Through-
out the protocol execution [P, s] may learn its unique pub-
licly known session id sidsP . Instances of M, F and H that
hold identical session ids sidsM = sid
s
F = sid
s
H are partnered,
i.e. participate in the same session.
Upon the protocol invocation the instance [P, s] is initial-
ized with the long-lived key LLP and turns into a processing
state where it proceeds according to the protocol specifica-
tion, until it collects enough information to decide whether
the protocol execution was successful (we say an instance
accepts) or not (we say an instance aborts). Finally, the in-
stance terminates meaning that it stops processing any fur-
ther protocol messages. In a WRT protocol different partic-
ipants have different acceptance criteria, i.e., an instance of
F accepts when it is ready to create the tunnel, in particular
after the computation of the session tunnel key Kt ∈ {0, 1}κ,
whereas the instances of M and H accept when they are
ready to communicate with each over the tunnel, in par-
ticular after the computation of the session end-to-end key
KM,H ∈ {0, 1}κ (in addition to Kt).
4.2 Security Model
4.2.1 Security Associations and Commitments
The mobile device M and its home network H are as-
sumed to maintain some security association (as a result
of the initialization), and to accept the provided tunnel con-
nection if they can successfully authenticate each other upon
the tunnel establishment.
To the contrary, there is no security association between
M and F prior to the execution of Π, i.e. M and F need
not to be aware of each other, which is fairly natural in
the case of roaming. Therefore, in questions related to the
authorized WRT participation both, M and F , rely on H.
On the other hand, as part of their contract we assume
that F creates a tunnel to H if it successfully authenticates
H, whereas H accepts the provided tunnel after the success-
ful authentication of F (in addition to the authentication of
M). Nevertheless, this does not rule out attacks by mali-
cious F trying to impersonate M towards H.
4.2.2 Adversarial Model
The adversary A modeled as a PPT machine is assumed
to have complete control over the protocol invocation and
the communication channels. Additionally, we allow A to
corrupt parties. However, we will restrict this latter ability
of A in a meaningful way upon defining the actual security
goals. We model possible actions of A through the following
set of queries:
- Invoke(P,m): This is the protocol invocation query
that can be asked for some entity P ∈ {M,F ,H}.
In response, a new instance [P, s] is created and A is
given its first outgoing message. The optional input
m indicates the message expected by the instance to
start the execution; for the initiator of the protocol m
is supposed to be empty.
- Send(P, s,m): This query models communication con-
trol by A and contains a message m which should be
delivered to the s-th instance of P ∈ {M,F ,H}. The
adversary can decide honestly to forward protocol mes-
sages between the instances in order to eavesdrop the
protocol execution (that is A remains passive) or to
manipulate or inject messages (that is A becomes ac-
tive). In response, A receives the outgoing message
of [P, s], or an an empty message if [P, s] terminates
having processed m.
- Corrupt(P ): This query models corruptions of P ∈
{M,F ,H}. In response, A receives LLP . As soon
as A corrupts P , all instances of P are also treated as
corrupted.
- RevealKey(P, s): This query models independence of
end-to-end keys computed by the instances of P ∈
{M,H} in different sessions. In response, A is given
KM,H held by the instance; the query is answered only
if [P, s] has accepted.
- RevealTunnelKey(P, s): This query models independence
of tunnel keys computed by the instances of P ∈ {M,F ,
H} in different sessions. In response, A is given Kt
held by the instance; the query is answered only if
[P, s] has accepted.
4.2.3 Correctness
The following definition of correctness, given from the per-
spective of one particular session, specifies the purpose of Π
with respect to the tunnel creation and key establishment.
Definition 1 (Correctness). An authentication and
key establishment protocol for WRT Π is correct if in the
presence of a passive adversary A the invoked instances of
M, F , and H terminated having accepted and all of the
following holds: M and H hold the same end-to-end key
KM,H; M, F , and H hold the same tunnel key Kt.
4.2.4 Security Goals
We start by defining the requirement of mutual authenti-
cation (MA) between the instances ofM and H. In order to
reduce the complexity of the model (and proofs) Definition
2 captures additional sub-goals related to the agreement on
the session end-to-end and tunnel keys computed by the in-
stances of M and H, i.e., that at the end of the successful
protocol execution both instances hold identical keys (these
sub-goals are expressed through conditions 3 and 4). The
significant difference is that for the agreement on the tunnel
key Kt, the foreign network F should remain uncorrupted,
whereas no such restriction is made for the mutual authenti-
cation betweenM and H and the agreement on the end-to-
end key KM,H. This models possible attacks of a malicious
F trying to impersonate eitherM or H or to influence a dis-
agreement on the established session end-to-end key KM,H.
Since the tunnel key Kt will be used to protect control mes-
sages for the maintenance of the tunnel (and not to protect
the actual service requests of M and responses of H) we
refrain from consideration of malicious M, H, or F aiming
to compromise the agreement on Kt.
Definition 2 (MA between M and H). Given a cor-
rect protocol Π by Gamema-m-hΠ (A, κ) we denote the interaction
between the instances ofM, F and H with a PPT adversary
A that is allowed to query Invoke, Send, Corrupt, RevealKey,
and RevealTunnelKey. A wins if at some point during the
interaction: (1) an uncorrupted instance of M accepts but
there is no uncorrupted partnered instance of H, or (2) an
uncorrupted instance of H accepts but there is no uncor-
rupted partnered instance of M, or (3) uncorrupted part-
nered instances ofM and H accept without holding the same
session end-to-end key KM,H, or (4) F is uncorrupted and
uncorrupted partnered instances of M and H accept without
holding the same session tunnel key Kt.
The maximum probability of this event over all adversaries
(running in time κ) is denoted
Succma-m-hΠ (A, κ) = maxA |Pr[A wins in Gamema-m-hΠ (A, κ)]|.
Π provides mutual authentication betweenM and H if this
probability is negligible in κ.
Our next Definition 3 aims to define similar goals with
respect to the instances of F andH: in particular the mutual
authentication requirement (conditions 1 and 2), and the
requirement related to the agreement on the tunnel key Kt
(condition 3). Note that the mutual authentication between
F and H does not depend on the honesty ofM that can be
corrupted by A. Similar to the previous definition M, F ,
and H are treated as honest with respect to the agreement
on Kt.
Definition 3 (MA between F and H). Given a cor-
rect protocol Π by Gamema-f-hΠ (A, κ) we denote the interaction
between the instances ofM, F and H with a PPT adversary
A that is allowed to query Invoke, Send, Corrupt, RevealKey,
and RevealTunnelKey. A wins if at some point during the
interaction: (1) an uncorrupted instance of F accepts but
there is no uncorrupted partnered instance of H, or (2) an
uncorrupted instance of H accepts but there is no uncor-
rupted partnered instance of F , or (3)M is uncorrupted and
uncorrupted partnered instances of F and H accept without
holding the same session tunnel key Kt.
The maximum probability of this event over all adversaries
(running in time κ) is denoted
Succma-f-hΠ (A, κ) = maxA |Pr[A wins in Gamema-f-hΠ (A, κ)]|.
Π provides mutual authentication between F and H if this
probability is negligible in κ.
Here, we provide some observations concerning Definitions
2 and 3 with respect to the authorization issues. Recall, that
according to our model instances of protocol participants are
seen as partnered if they hold the same session ids. This im-
plies that any protocol Π which satisfies both of the above
defined mutual authentication requirements ensures that if
an uncorrupted instance of H accepts then there are uncor-
rupted instances ofM and F that are also partnered. That
is the decision of H to accept in some session of Π implies
thatH treatsM and F as authorized participants of a WRT
session. Since our model does not consider maliciousM, F ,
or H aiming to disrupt the agreement on Kt the above men-
tioned “transitive” partnering between the instances of M
and F ensures that all partnered instances that accept in
some protocol session hold the same session tunnel key Kt.
In the following we focus on the secrecy of KM,H and Kt.
For this, we make use of the classical notion of authenticated
key exchange (AKE) security (cf. [10, 18, 19]), adopted to
the setting of our model. The basic idea of AKE-security in
WRT is to model the indistinguishability of KM,H and Kt
computed in some test session from some randomly chosen
values by any outsider adversary. The significant difference
is that for KM,H a possibly malicious foreign network F
should be also treated as such adversary.
In order to model the AKE-security of the end-to-end key
KM,H we first specify the auxiliary notion of e2e-freshness
for the instances of M and H, which defines the conditions
under which A can be treated as an outsider with respect
to the test session for which it has to distinguish KM,H. In
particular, these conditions prevent active participation of
A on behalf of eitherM or H by restricting A from respec-
tive corruptions, and capture known-key attacks allowing A
to reveal end-to-end keys computed in sessions that are dif-
ferent from the test session. Moreover, A is not restricted
from revealing Kt. That is the knowledge of Kt (e.g., by
F) should not compromise the end-to-end communication
security between M and H.
Definition 4 (e2e-Freshness). In the execution of Π
an instance [P, s] with P ∈ {M,H} is e2e-fresh if none of
the following holds:
• A asks Corrupt(P );
• Case P =M: A asks RevealKey(M, s) after [M, s]
has accepted or RevealKey(H, t) after [H, t] has ac-
cepted and [M, s] and [H, t] are partnered;
• Case P = H: A asks RevealKey(H, s) after [H, s] has
accepted or RevealKey(M, t) after [M, t] has accepted
and [H, s] and [M, t] are partnered.
In order to model the AKE-security of the tunnel key Kt
we specify the auxiliary notion of t-freshness, this time for
the instances ofM, F , and H, which defines the conditions
under which A can be treated as an outsider with respect
to the test session for which it has to distinguish Kt. These
conditions are widely similar to those defined for the e2e-
freshness except that A is now allowed to reveal tunnel keys
computed in sessions that are different from the test session,
and is not restricted from revealing KM,H.
Definition 5 (t-Freshness). In the execution of Π an
instance [P, s] with P ∈ {M,F ,H} is t-fresh if none of the
following holds:
• A asks Corrupt(P );
• Case P =M: A asks RevealTunnelKey(M, s) after [M, s]
has accepted or RevealTunnelKey(P ′, t) for P ′ ∈ {H,F}
after [P ′, t] has accepted and [M, s] and [P ′, t] are part-
nered;
• Case P = F : A asks RevealTunnelKey(F , s) after [F , s]
has accepted or RevealTunnelKey(P ′, t) for P ′ ∈ {M,H}
after [P ′, t] has accepted and [F , s] and [P ′, t] are part-
nered;
• Case P = H: A asks RevealTunnelKey(H, s) after [H, s]
has accepted or RevealTunnelKey(P ′, t) for P ′ ∈ {M,F}
after [P ′, t] has accepted and [H, s] and [P ′, t] are part-
nered.
Further, we introduce two additional queries TestKey(P, s)
and TestTunnelKey(P, s). The query TestKey(P, s) can be
asked to an instance of P ∈ {M,H} and is answered only
if the instance [P, s] has already accepted. The answer of
this query is based on some secret bit b ∈ {0, 1} chosen
in advance. In response to TestKey(P, s) A is given either
KM,H (if b = 1) or a randomly chosen value from {0, 1}κ
(if b = 0). The only difference between TestKey(P, s) and
TestTunnelKey(P, s) is that for the latter we assume P ∈
{M,F ,H} and the key which is returned in the case that
bit b = 1 is the tunnel key Kt.
Now we are ready to formally define AKE-security for
the end-to-end and tunnel keys computed in Π. Using the
auxiliary definitions of e2e- and t-freshness we can provide
one definition for both goals.
Definition 6 (E2E / Tunnel AKE). Given a correct
protocol Π, a uniformly chosen bit b, a type of AKE-security
α ∈ {ake-e2e, ake-t}, and a PPT adversary A with access to
the queries Invoke, Send, Corrupt, RevealKey, RevealTunnelKey,
and TestKey (if α = ake-e2e) or TestTunnelKey (if α =
ake-t), by Gameα,bΠ (A, κ) we denote the following interaction
between the instances of M, F and H with A:
• A interacts with instances via queries;
• Case α = ake-e2e: at some point A asks a TestKey
query to an instance [P, s] which has accepted and is
e2e-fresh (and remains such by the end of the inter-
action);
Case α = ake-t: at some point A asks a TestTunnelKey
query to an instance [P, s] which has accepted and is
t-fresh (and remains such by the end of the interac-
tion);
• A continues interacting with instances and when A ter-
minates, it outputs a bit, which is then set as the output
of the interaction.
A wins if the output of Gameα,bΠ (A, κ) is identical to b. The
maximum probability of the adversarial advantage over the
random guess of b, over all adversaries (running in time κ)
is denoted
AdvαΠ(A, κ) = maxA |2 Pr[Gameα,bΠ (A, κ) = b]− 1|.
If this advantage is negligible in κ and α = ake-e2e (or α =
ake-t) then Π provides end-to-end (or tunnel) AKE-security.
Remark. Our notions of freshness restrict A from cor-
ruptions of M and H (in e2e-freshness) and from corrup-
tions ofM, F , and H (in t-freshness). This implies that our
definitions of AKE-security do not consider forward secrecy.
This is done on purpose, since the basic version of our pro-
tocol specified and formally analyzed in Section 5 does not
provide this property, mainly for the reasons of efficiency, re-
sulting in a possible use of the protocol for the performance-
constrained mobile devices. Nevertheless, in Section 6.1 we
show, how forward secrecy for KM,H and Kt can be easily
achieved using the classical Diffie-Hellman technique [22].
5. AUTHENTICATION AND KEY ESTAB-
LISHMENT PROTOCOL FOR WRT
In the following we introduce AWRT — our protocol for au-
thentication and key establishment for WRT between M,
F , and H. This section describes its basic version, analyzes
security and evaluates performance. Optional security ex-
tensions and the discussion on the use of AWRT in commercial
networks are postponed to Section 6.
5.1 Building Blocks
AWRT uses several (well-known) cryptographic primitives:
• A pseudo-random function PRF : {0, 1}κ × {0, 1}∗ →
{0, 1}∗ which is used for the purpose of key deriva-
tion and can be realized using block-ciphers or keyed
one-way hash functions. By AdvprfPRF(κ) we denote the
maximum advantage over all PPT adversaries (run-
ning within time κ) in distinguishing the outputs of
PRF from those of a random function better than by a
random guess.
• An asymmetric encryption scheme satisfying the prop-
erty of indistinguishability under (adaptive) chosen-
ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2) [42] whose encryption
and decryption operations are denoted E and D, re-
spectively. By Advind-cca2(E,D) (κ) we denote the maximum
advantage over all PPT adversaries (running within
time κ) in breaking the IND-CCA2 property of (E ,D)
better than by a random guess; The property of IND-
CCA2 security is for example preserved in the sev-
eral encryption schemes including RSA-OAEP [11,27],
Cramer-Shoup [21], and DHIES [3].
• A digital signature scheme which provides existential
unforgeability under chosen message attacks (EUF-
CMA) whose signing and verification operations are
denoted Sig and V er, respectively. By Succeuf-cma(Sig,V er)(κ)
we denote the maximum success probability over all
PPT adversaries (running within time κ) given access
to the signing oracle in finding a forgery; Examples of
such schemes include DSS [41] and PSS [12], though
schemes that provide a stronger version of EUF-CMA
(cf. [14,30]) can be applied as well.
• A message authentication code function MAC that satis-
fies weak unforgeability against chosen message attacks
(WUF-CMA) [9], e.g., the popular function HMAC
[7, 8] can be used for this purpose. By Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ)
we denote the maximum success probability over all
PPT adversaries (running within time κ) given access
to the MAC oracle in finding a MAC forgery.
5.2 Initialization
We assume that prior to the execution of AWRT the in-
volved parties are in possession of the following long lived
keys: LLF consists of a private/public signature/verification
key pair (skF , vkF ) and a decryption/encryption key pair
(dkF , ekF ); LLH consists of a private/public signature/verifi-
cation key pair (skH, vkH) and a pair (M, (kM,αM)) where
(kM, αM) is a high-entropy secret key consisting of a PRF
key kM and a MAC key αM shared with the hosted M; con-
sequently LLM consists of (kM, αM). Note that in practice
it is sufficient for H andM to share kM and derive the cor-
responding MAC key αM as PRFkM(l) for some publicly fixed
label l.
Further we assume that the public keys of networks are
known amongst them in advance (implied by their contract).
They can also be handled via self-signed or classical PKI cer-
tificates. F and H can choose their long-lived keys indepen-
dently and H can choose kM for each hosted M according
to their assumed trust relationship.
Remark. Since the networks F and H can usually swap
their roles (e.g., bidirectional roaming contracts between
H and F , or a roaming contract among some set of net-
works from which F and H can be seen as any two cho-
sen networks), LLH may include some (dkH, ekH) and LLF
may also include (M, (kM, αM)) for each mobile device M
hosted by F .
Remark. For the purpose of efficiency and scalability
it might be desirable for the networks to use a single pri-
vate/public key pair to decrypt and to sign. There exist
several secure schemes that support both operations with
the same public key pair (and could be deployed in our pro-
tocol), e.g., [20]. Nevertheless, the use of the same key pair
in two different operations contradicts to the general prin-
ciples of a secure protocol design and is, therefore, not rec-
ommended.
5.3 Protocol Execution
In the following we provide some explanations on the tech-
niques used in our AWRT protocol and their relationship to
the security goals. The actual specification is illustrated in
Figure 1.
First, we mention an optional time-stamp T which can be
chosen by F and sent to H in order to address possible
accounting issues in commercial roaming scenarios where F
should be reimbursed for the provided tunnel connection;
more discussion on this can be found in Section 6.4.
AWRT uses publicly known distinct labels li, i = 1,. . .,3,
which are fixed in advance and used as input to PRF to derive
various secret keys at different protocol stages.
In AWRT each party P ∈ {M,F ,H} computes own ses-
sion id sidP as a concatenated bit string F|rF |M|rM|H|rH
where rP denotes a random nonce chosen by P .
The end-to-end key KM,H is derived by M and H as the
output of PRF (with label l3 and the session id) using the
shared secret key kM. Obviously, the equality sidM = sidH
is necessary for M and H to compute the same value of
KM,H. The assurance of this equality is given toM through
the MAC value µH since the corresponding MAC key αM is
known only to M and H. Similarly, H gains this assurance
from the MAC value µM. Observe that bits 0 and 1 are used
as additional inputs for the computation of µH and µM,
respectively, to break the “symmetry” and guarantee that
µH 6= µM. Due to the construction of session ids from
fresh nonces (seen as challenges) the successful verification
of these MAC values provides also the mutual authentication
between M and H.
The mutual authentication between F and H is achieved
via digital signatures σH and σF as the signed messages
include sidH and sidF , respectively.
The tunnel key Kt is derived by M, F , and H as the
output of PRF (with label l2 and the session id) using the
pre-tunnel key kt which is computed by the parties in two
different ways: M and H derive kt from PRF (with label l1
and the session id) using the shared secret kM, whereas F
obtains kt via decryption from the cipher-text χ received
from H. The protection of χ by σH ensures F that H holds
the same value for kt. Since F produces σF subsequently
to the verification of σH the validity of σF ensures H that
the cipher-text χ was delivered to F without modification
allowing F to decrypt the same value for kt. Note that the
mutual authentication between M and H also implies that
the partnered instances of these two parties derive the same
value for kt too.
Mobile DeviceM
{(kM, αM)}
Foreign Network F
{(skF , vkF ), (dkF , ekF )}
Home Network H
{(skH, vkH), (M, (kM, αM))}
rF ∈r {0, 1}κ; A := F|rF
←− A−−−−−−−−−−−
rM ∈r {0, 1}κ; B :=M|rM
−
B|H
−−−−−−−−−−−→
if H INVALID
then ABORT else
C := A|B
−
C|[T ]
−−−−−−−−−−−→
parse C as F|rF |M|rM
if [T OR]M INVALID
then ABORT else
rH ∈r {0, 1}κ
sidH := C|H|rH
kt := PRFkM (l1|sidH)
χ := EekF (kt)
µH := MACαM (0|sidH)
D := rH|χ|µH
σH :=
SigskH (sidH|[T ]|χ|µH)
←−
D|σH−−−−−−−−−−−
parse D as rH|χ|µH
sidF := C|H|rH
if σH INVALID
then ABORT else
kt := DdkF (χ)
E := rH|µH
←− E−−−−−−−−−−−
parse E as rH|µH
sidM := A|B|H|rH
if µH INVALID
then ABORT else
kt := PRFkM (l1|sidM)
µM := MACαM (1|sidM)
Kt := PRFkt (l2|sidM)
KM,H := PRFkM (l3|sidM)
ACCEPT
−
µM−−−−−−−−−−−→
σF := SigskF (sidF |µM)
Kt := PRFkt (l2|sidF )
ACCEPT
CREATE TUNNEL
−
µM|σF−−−−−−−−−−−→
if µM OR σF INVALID
then ABORT else
Kt := PRFkt (l2|sidH)
KM,H := PRFkM (l3|sidH)
ACCEPT
Figure 1: Illustration of the basic version of AWRT between the participating mobile deviceM, foreign network
F , and home network H. At the end of the protocol: M and H hold the end-to-end key KM,H; M, F , and H
hold the tunnel key Kt, so that the tunnel between M and H can be established by F .
5.4 Security Analysis
In this section we prove that AWRT satisfies the previously
defined security goals. In all our theorems by q we denote
the total number of the invoked protocol sessions in the cor-
responding interactions between the adversary A and the
protocol participants. We start by proving the defined mu-
tual authentication goals. The proofs of all stated theorems
can be found in the full version of this paper available from
the authors’ websites.
Theorem 1 (MA between M and H). Given a WUF-
CMA secure MAC the basic version of AWRT described in Fig-
ure 1 provides mutual authentication between the participat-
ing mobile device and its home network in the sense of Def-
inition 2, and
Succma-m-hAWRT (κ) ≤ 2q
2
2κ
+ 2Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ).
Theorem 2 (MA between F and H). Given a EUF-
CMA secure (Sig, V er) the basic version of AWRT described
in Figure 1 provides mutual authentication between the par-
ticipating foreign and home networks in the sense of Defini-
tion 3, and
Succma-f-hAWRT (κ) ≤ 2q
2
2κ
+ 2Succeuf-cma(Sig,V er)(κ).
Now we focus on the AKE-security of the established ses-
sion end-to-end and tunnel keys.
Theorem 3 (End-to-End AKE). Given a WUF-CMA
secure MAC and a pseudo-random PRF the basic version of
AWRT described in Figure 1 provides end-to-end AKE-security
in the sense of Definition 6, and
Advake-e2eAWRT (κ) ≤ 4q
2
2κ
+ 4Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ) + 4qAdv
prf
PRF(κ).
Theorem 4 (Tunnel AKE). Given a EUF-CMA se-
cure (Sig, V er), a IND-CCA2 secure (E ,D) and a pseudo-
random PRF the basic version of AWRT described in Figure 1
provides tunnel AKE-security in the sense of Definition 6,
and
Advake-e2eAWRT (κ) ≤6q
2
2κ
+ 4Succwuf-cmaMAC (κ) + 4Succ
euf-cma
(Sig,V er)(κ)+
2qAdvind-cca2(E,D) (κ) + 6qAdv
prf
PRF(κ).
5.5 Remarks on Efficiency
In case of roaming protocols the most significant impact
on the communication complexity has the number of com-
munication rounds on the path with the highest round trip
time, i.e. the link between F and H. Therefore, several so-
lutions for the non-tunnel-based roaming mentioned in Sec-
tion 3 aim to minimize this number. However, in a WRT
session each request of M would imply one full communi-
cation round between the networks. Nevertheless, it is still
desirable to minimize this communication before the tunnel
is created in order to reduce the impact of possible network
faults and DoS attacks. With this in mind we observe that
our AWRT protocol requires one full communication round be-
tween the networks prior to the creation of the tunnel by F .
The additional half a round needed to deliver the authenti-
cation information to H can be easily interleaved with the
first service request of M. In this sense our AWRT protocol
is comparable to the authentication protocols from [40,47].
Further, the specification given in Figure 1 separates mes-
sages according to the two simultaneous mutual authenti-
cation processes that take place between M and H, and
between F and H. This significantly simplifies the proof.
However, some communication bandwidth can be saved by
removing the MAC value µM from the last message of F to
H, still allowing H to verify µM indirectly, via the verifi-
cation of σF . This optimization relies on the assumption
that F could not have created valid σF without knowing
the required µM, thus, implying the necessary communica-
tion between F andM due to the unforgeability of MAC and
the secrecy of αM.
Finally, we observe that in AWRT the mobile deviceM does
not need to perform any costly public-key operations, un-
like the non-tunnel-based protocols in [6, 29, 36, 37, 39] and
the WRT approach in [48]. Hence, AWRT can also be used
with performance-constraint mobile devices such as PDAs
and smart phones provided they have a wireless IP interface.
Note that AWRT uses public-key operations for the transport
of kt and for the mutual authentication between F and H.
Remark. If desired, the modularity of AWRT allows to com-
pletely remove public-key operations (and the corresponding
long-lived keys) resulting in a more efficient protocol that
would nevertheless still ensure end-to-end security between
M and H in the presence of F (yet more efficient than [48])
without providing the tunnel key and the mutual authenti-
cation between the networks.
5.6 Ideas on Practical Realization and Tunnel
Establishment
The description of AWRT in Figure 1 is kept general. There-
fore, in the following we highlight some practical ideas on
the realization of the protocol across the Internet based on
the available standards.
The foreign network F will typically participate in AWRT
using its own access point to whichM connects on the data-
link layer (layer 2) prior to the execution of AWRT. Since
the communication between M and F takes part on layer
2 there is no need for F to assign an IP address to M.
Moreover, on the link between M and F the protocol can
be implemented as a new EAP method within IEEE 802.1X.
The home network H can participate in AWRT as a gateway
or a protocol-specific server with some known DNS name
or IP address, i.e. protocol messages exchanged between F
and H can be transmitted over Internet through a classical
UDP connection.
Once AWRT is successfully executed, F can continue acting
as a layer 2 bridge toH for the whole roaming session. In this
wayM can be seen as “local” from the perspective of H, i.e.
H can allocate own IP address forM either as a parameter
within AWRT or via DHCP. Messages betweenM and H can
be tunneled using a simple IP-over-IP or upper layer proto-
col (such as L2TP [52]). The end-to-end traffic between M
and H can be protected using the Authentication Header
(AH) or Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) mechanisms
in the tunnel mode, as defined within IPsec [32], whereby
deriving the session key from KM,H, i.e., without executing
IKE [17], the native key exchange protocol of IPsec.
Further, in order to avoid session hijacking attacks (incl.
traffic injection), the tunnel path between F and H can
also be secured using AH or ESP mechanisms, this time in
the transport mode, whereby the corresponding session key
should be derived from Kt.
6. OPTIONAL PROTOCOL EXTENSIONS
AWRT can be extended in a modular way to deal with the
issues of forward secrecy, resistance to certain types of DoS
attacks, anonymity and unlinkability of roaming sessions,
and accounting in commercial scenarios with the reimburse-
ment of F upon the provided roaming service.
6.1 Forward Secrecy
Roughly speaking the requirement of forward secrecy for
some session key means that an adversary should not be able
to break the AKE-security of the protocol even if it gains
access to the long-lived keys of participants after their in-
stances have accepted in the test session. The common way
to achieve forward secrecy is to derive the key from some in-
dependent ephemeral secret information which is valid only
for one particular session.
6.1.1 Forward Secrecy of End-to-End Keys
In order to achieve forward secrecy for KM,H we can
modify the basic version of AWRT using the classical Diffie-
Hellman technique [22] and assuming that the necessary
computations are performed in some cyclic group G of prime
order q (polynomial in κ) generated by g. The idea is
to derive KM,H from an ephemeral secret gxMxH (with
xM, xH ∈ Zq) as an output of PRFf(gxMxH )(l3|sid) where
f is a randomness extractor (cf. [24]) and sid the corre-
sponding session id. For this, M must choose its own se-
cret exponent xM and include gxM into its first protocol
message, thus sending B|gxM |H to F which then forwards
C|T |gxM to H. In turn, H chooses own secret exponent xH
and includes gxH into its protocol message D|gxH |σH while
computing µH over 0|sidH|gxM |gxH allowing M to check
the integrity of delivered gxM and sent gxH . For the same
reason, M must compute own µM over 1|sidM|gxM |gxH .
Note that the AKE-security of such KM,H would further
rely on the hardness of the Decisional Diffie-Hellman Prob-
lem [13].
6.1.2 Forward Secrecy of Tunnel Keys
In order to achieve forward secrecy for Kt we can apply
a Generalized Diffie-Hellman technique, used e.g. in [16]
for the purpose of group key exchange. Let G be a cyclic
group and g its generator as described in the previous para-
graph. The goal is to derive Kt from an ephemeral se-
cret gxMxFxH (with xM, xF , xH ∈ Zq) as an output of
PRFf(gxMxFxH )(l2|sid). In this case all computations in-
volving the pre-tunnel key kt become obsolete. Therefore,
the modified protocol does not require to keep the decryp-
tion/encryption key pair (dkF , ekF ) as part of the foreign
network’s long-lived key. The protocol proceeds as follows.
M includes gxM into its first protocol message B|gxM |H
to F which in turn chooses own exponent xF and sends
C|T |gxM |gxF |gxMxF over to H. Then, H chooses own xH
and replies with D′|σH where D′ := rH|gxMxH |gxFxH |µH
with µH computed over 0|sidH|gxM |gxFxH (allowing M to
check the integrity of delivered gxM and sent gxFxH), and
σH computed over D′|gxM |gxF |gxMxF (allowing F also to
check the integrity of gxM , gxF , and gxMxF , delivered to
H in the previous message of F). F includes gxFxH into
its message E|gxFxH to M. Finally, M computes µM over
1|sidM|gxM |gxFxH , and F computes σF over sidF |µM|gxMxH .
It is easy to check that at the end of the successful protocol
execution all parties are able to compute identical
gxMxFxH = (gxMxF )xH = (gxMxH)xF = (gxFxH)xM
and derive the same Kt. Note that in this case the AKE-
security of such Kt would further rely on the hardness of the
Group Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem [15].
We stress that if forward secrecy should be simultaneously
achieved for KM,H and Kt thenM andH must use different
independently chosen exponents for the computation of each
of these keys; otherwise KM,H can be easily recovered using
message D′. Note that achieving forward secrecy increases
the protocol costs by additional modular exponentiations.
Remark. Some recent work on AKE-security, addition-
ally, strengthens A by allowing it to corrupt participants or
reveal ephemeral secrets used by (uncorrupted) participants
during the test session. It might be possible to apply tech-
niques used in [35] to achieve such strong AKE-security for
the session keys computed in AWRT (at least for the end-to-
end key KM,H). However, we leave such discussion out of
scope of the current work.
6.2 Denial-of-Service and Hijacking
Here we present some ideas on how to enhance AWRT to-
wards resistance against some types of DoS attacks. Due to
the higher communication delays on the path between F and
H it might be desirable to decrease the risk that F opens
a connection to H for the third protocol message without
gaining stronger confidence that a party which requested
the tunnel is a valid mobile device hosted by H; otherwise a
DoS-attacker can compose the second protocol message B|H
and then simply close own connection. A possible solution
to minimize this risk is to equip M with a corresponding
public key certificate issued by H and demand a signature
on this second message (which also includes a fresh nonce of
F). Observe, that this solution, although computationally
expensive, minimizes the risk since the attacker must either
forge the signature or be a holder of some valid certificate.
Nevertheless, it is not completely satisfactory since F is not
able to judge (without further interaction) whether the cer-
tificate has not been revoked. One could further reduce the
risk by requiring that device certificates are issued for some
short validity period.
A similar threat is given for H which could be forced to
keep the connection to F after the fourth protocol message
without gaining stronger confidence that both parties M
and F are legitimate; otherwise a DoS attacker may flood
H with messages of the form C|T and close own connection
thereafter. The risk here can be minimized by requiring that
C|T is signed by F whereby the time-stamp T would also
serve as a protection against replay attacks. Note that this
signature cannot replace σF from the last message as this
is required for the mutual authentication between F and H.
Additional confidence for H that C|T has been sent by F
after the communication with a valid M can be achieved
by letting M compute a MAC value µ′H on the message B|H
using αM and F to forward C|T |µ′H (in addition to its sig-
nature) to H. Note that µ′H cannot replace µH as the latter
is needed for the mutual authentication betweenM and H.
Finally, we consider protection against hijacking of a roam-
ing session, mentioned in [47] for the non-tunnel-based case.
Similarly, in WRT an attacker can wait until the protocol
completes and the tunnel is established and then try to hi-
jack the session from M or H (or both of them — tunnel
hijacking). On the wireless link between M and F the ses-
sion can be hijacked by using a more powerful transmitting
device thanM, and on the path between F andH a hijacker
can be any intermediate communication node. In WRT this
attack may be used to waste the bandwidth resources as-
signed to the tunnel by F . Our basic protocol allows for an
elegant solution through the use of the tunnel key Kt requir-
ing that each message which is supposed to be sent through
the tunnel during the roaming session is authenticated such
that F is able to verify its validity prior to the delivery. Note
that a hijacker cannot bias the end-to-end communication
between M and H which is protected by KM,H.
6.3 Confidentiality ofM’s Identity
Whenever a mobile device roams across several foreign
networks (contract partners of H) it might be desirable to
keep its identity M undisclosed and even to prevent (pos-
sibly colluding) foreign networks from being able to link its
roaming activities, thus eliminating the risk of profiling (ex-
amples for this can also be found in roaming for mobile
phone networks, e.g., TMSI in GSM and UMTS). A straight-
forward solution is to let M choose some set of “one-time”
roaming aliases and reveal them to its home network before
it roams. Obviously, this solution requires additional stor-
age resources and its most significant disadvantage is that
M must choose (and update) its aliases while being in the
area covered by H (see also the discussion in [40]).
Our AWRT protocol allows for a more elegant approach if we
rely on the fact that each home network usually serves as a
foreign network from the perspective of its contract partners.
This implies that LLH used in AWRT also includes a key pair
(dkH, ekH). Assuming that M knows ekH we can slightly
modify AWRT by replacing the identityM in the second pro-
tocol message with its encrypted equivalent EekH(M) which
will also be used in the construction of session ids. Obvi-
ously, upon receiving C|T the home network would be able
to recoverM through the corresponding decryption. Due to
the IND-CCA2 property of (E ,D) this solution would ensure
not only anonymity of M towards F but also the unlinka-
bility among different AWRT executions with M; at the cost
of one additional public key operation by M and H.
6.4 Reimbursement of F’s Roaming Costs
In commercial scenarios the foreign network F has to be
reimbursed for the provided roaming service. Since F is not
aware ofM it usually presents its claims toH. Note that the
reimbursement process (as any payment process) cannot be
realized solely using cryptographic techniques. Nevertheless,
it might be desirable to allow F to support its claims with
some cryptographic proof, which can also be shown to some
judge. Observe, that in AWRT the foreign network obtains σH
computed amongst other parameters on the identity F and
the time-stamp T chosen by F . However, the existence of σH
alone does not guarantee that F created a tunnel to H and
actually provided the roaming service. Therefore, upon the
maintenance of the tunnel F may request further signatures
σ′H from H computed on some fresh time-stamp T ′ > T
and the session id, and close the tunnel connection if the ex-
pected signature is not delivered. Special control messages
exchanged between M and H and protected using keys de-
rived from KM,H can be specified in order to ensure H (and
M) that the tunnel has been created and kept open during
the interval [T, T ′]; otherwise H may refuse to send σ′H. A
valid pair (σH, σ′H) would then serve as a cryptographically
protected acknowledgement of H that the tunnel connection
was kept open by F within the time interval [T, T ′].
7. CONCLUSION
The wireless roaming approach via tunnels preserves the
home network’s role as the actual service provider and has
a number of additional security benefits. However, it opens
new challenges on the authentication and key establishment
protocol that precedes the establishment of the tunnel con-
nection. Having formally specified the necessary require-
ments we designed an appropriate provably secure proto-
col AWRT which requires one communication round between
the foreign and the home network prior to the creation of
the tunnel. Additionally, we provide some ideas on possi-
ble extensions of the basic version of AWRT towards forward
secrecy, DoS resistance, anonymity of roaming mobile de-
vices and unlinkability of roaming sessions, and argued on
the possible use of AWRT in commercial scenarios. The most
appealing future work is the detailed specification of the
protocol within the EAP framework and its implementation
based on current standards within a suitable WRT archi-
tecture (the architecture can be based on the ideas given
in [48]), whereby special attention should be paid to the re-
alization of the tunnel connection, including the necessary
control messages and their protection.
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